[tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

[grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx>]

https://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-uk-is-using-bulk-interception-to-catch-criminalsand-not-telling-them
https://conspicuouschatter.wordpress.com/2016/02/03/a-technical-reading-of-the-himr-data-mining-research-problem-book/
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702948-Problem-Book-Redacted.html

Researchers have speculated that GCHQ may have the capability to
deanonymise Tor users by examining the timing of connections going in
and out of the Tor network.
...
there is clear evidence that timing information is both recognized as
being key to correlating events and streams; and it is being recorded
and stored at an increasing granularity. There is no smoking gun as of
2011 to say they casually de-anonymize Tor circuits, but the writing
is on the wall for the onion routing system. GCHQ at 2011 had all
ingredients needed to trace Tor circuits. It would take extra-ordinary
incompetence to not have refined their traffic analysis techniques in
the past 5 years. The Tor project should do well to not underestimate
GCHQâs capabilities to this point.
...
one should wonder why we have been waiting for 3 years until such
clear documents are finally being published from the Snowden
revelations. If those had been the first published, instead of the
obscure, misleading and very non-informative slides, it would have
saved a lot of time â and may even have engaged the public a bit more
than bad powerpoint.

http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-uk-will-police-the-dark-web-with-a-new-task-force
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows


Prediction market (place your bids):
"First networks utilizing fill traffic as TA countermeasure to
emerge and reach early deployment by year end 2017..."
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