Re: [tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

[juanjo <juanjo@xxxxxxxxx>]

Something like this is what I feared when days ago I sent a message to
this list... If you allow Tor Browser to have all hops from the same
country, or the Tor network relies only on a few countries to host their
nodes (Germany, US, France) then Tor will be useless soon...

https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2016-May/040991.html

El 02/06/16 a las 06:13, grarpamp escribiÃ:
> https://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-uk-is-using-bulk-interception-to-catch-criminalsand-not-telling-them
> https://conspicuouschatter.wordpress.com/2016/02/03/a-technical-reading-of-the-himr-data-mining-research-problem-book/
> https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2702948-Problem-Book-Redacted.html
>
> Researchers have speculated that GCHQ may have the capability to
> deanonymise Tor users by examining the timing of connections going in
> and out of the Tor network.
> ...
> there is clear evidence that timing information is both recognized as
> being key to correlating events and streams; and it is being recorded
> and stored at an increasing granularity. There is no smoking gun as of
> 2011 to say they casually de-anonymize Tor circuits, but the writing
> is on the wall for the onion routing system. GCHQ at 2011 had all
> ingredients needed to trace Tor circuits. It would take extra-ordinary
> incompetence to not have refined their traffic analysis techniques in
> the past 5 years. The Tor project should do well to not underestimate
> GCHQâs capabilities to this point.
> ...
> one should wonder why we have been waiting for 3 years until such
> clear documents are finally being published from the Snowden
> revelations. If those had been the first published, instead of the
> obscure, misleading and very non-informative slides, it would have
> saved a lot of time â and may even have engaged the public a bit more
> than bad powerpoint.
>
> http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-uk-will-police-the-dark-web-with-a-new-task-force
> https://blog.torproject.org/blog/traffic-correlation-using-netflows
>
>
> Prediction market (place your bids):
> "First networks utilizing fill traffic as TA countermeasure to
> emerge and reach early deployment by year end 2017..."

-- 
tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
To unsubscribe or change other settings go to
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk