> The Tor network with Private Exits:
> Alice uses Tor Browser to connect to myexit.onion.
> Tor Browser connects to a guard note, then a middle node, then to
> myexit.onion. myexit.onion provides a portal to the internet via a web
> interface similar to a VNC session. myexit.onion is not recognized as a
> Tor exit node and Alice can then go to mywebsite.com without any extra
> harassment. […]
(If I understand that correctly)
If the “private exit node” belongs to Alice, then it is no longer
anonymizing her. It’s no different than Alice running a VPN service for
herself, except it’s very convolutd and wastes resources on hopping
through Tor for no gain. Similar story with multi-user tor relay from
some company: the user are not anonymous to the provider, so any
anonymization layer between them and the final relay is useless.
This idea is also usable right now without any changes to Tor. Alice
may setup her own proxy and connect to it through Tor. But it offers no
protection. This is basically:
,-------. ,-------. ,-----------------.
| Alice | <---~ tor ~---> | Alice | <---> | Public internet |
`-------' `-------' `-----------------'
… and …
,-------. ,-----------. ,-----------------.
| Alice | <--~ tor ~--> | Provider | <---> | Public internet |
`-------' | knowing | `-----------------'
| Bob | | it’s Bob, |
`-------' | Alice, … |
| … | `-----------'
`-------'
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