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As many of you have probably seen, some CAIDA folks have come up
with a method for fingerprinting machines on the 'net by
calculating the box's clock skew.
Since the express purpose of tor is to allow people to use the
Internet anonymously, this could be a direct "attack" on tor.
Thinking about it a bit, it appears to me that tor is not vuln
to this as the "fingerprintee" would only be susceptible during
it's first hop to the tor entry server. The middle & exit
servers would then change the timestamp to their /own/
timestamp and then send that to the final web server.
Am I looking at this correctly? Does tor mitigate these
That said, are their any other suggestions for preventing these
types of fingerprinting?
http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/03/04/1355253 ok, i'm a
bit embarassed to be linking to slashdot... ;)