Re: Defeat Exit Node Sniffing?

["Michael_google gmail_Gersten" <keybounce@xxxxxxxxx>]

>  Also, see the Tor technical FAQ wiki entry for this:
>
>  https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#head-5e18f8a8f98fa9e69ffac725e96f39641bec7ac1

Which says:

We'd like to make it still work even if the service is nearby the Tor
relay but not on the same IP address. But there are a variety of
technical problems we need to overcome first (the main one being "how
does the Tor client learn which relays are associated with which
websites in a decentralized yet non-gamable way?").

Here's a simple idea. Just as search engines added a "robots.txt"
file, how about a web server providing a "torexit.txt" file, which is
simply the list of tor exit nodes that the server considers "close" to
itself?

In other words, if I run a web server, I would list the tor nodes that
I consider safe and nearby. Maybe they're something I run and control
on a physically nearby machine. (Maybe even on an adjacent computer?).

It's not attackable, without being able to attack the web server
itself. Granted, that's not perfect, but if you can attack the web
server, then tricking tor users is probably not the biggest fish to
catch.