Thus spake coderman (coderman@xxxxxxxxx): > a lot of infrastructure to build; call it Tor 2.0: > > combine LEDBAT edge management[0] with SCTP multi-homed[1] endpoints > over ORCHID overlay[2] provided by IPsec telescopes[3] with reliable > multicast gradients[4] and stochastic fair queuing[5] and you've got > something resistant to passive and active attacks, including traffic > confirmation. Your ideas intrigue me and I wish to subscribe to your newsletter. Can you describe in a bit more detail (perhaps in a new thread) how stitching together a Frankenstein's creation from this collection of protocols would work, and how it would be deployed? And what about the edge vulnerability to these same tagging and/or timing attacks? Data's gotta get into this mess somehow, and come out again, right? > 0. http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-ledbat-congestion-09 > 1. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4960 > 2. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4843 > 3. http://disi.unitn.it/locigno/preprints/TR-DISI-08-041.pdf > 4. http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4410 > 5. http://www2.rdrop.com/~paulmck/scalability/paper/sfq.2002.06.04.pdf Do free reference implementations exist for all of these protocols? -- Mike Perry
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