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Re: [tor-talk] Intercept: NSA MONKEYROCKET: Cryptocurrency / AnonBrowser Service - Full Take Tracking Users, Trojan SW
I'm puzzled by the entire basis of this posting. Bitcoin is, in itself, well-known to be completely transparent on the blockchain, making transactions traceable as a matter of course. Considerable study has been done in this regard. Bitcoin anonymity can only be guaranteed where transactions - the purchase of bitcoin itself - cannot be tied to a real world account and identity.
The warning also seems to hinge on the use of a particular application in order to provide an exploit, though this is unclear.
Have I got this wrong?
https://hackernoon.com/privacy-on-the-blockchain-7549b50160ec
https://cointelegraph.com/news/are-bitcoin-transactions-traceable
https://www.novetta.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/NovettaBiometrics_BitcoinCryptocurrency_WP-W_9182015.pdf
Sent from ProtonMail, Swiss-based encrypted email.
‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ Original Message ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐
On March 20, 2018 6:40 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>
> https://theintercept.com/2018/03/20/the-nsa-worked-to-track-down-bitcoin-users-snowden-documents-reveal/
>
> https://www.reddit.com/search?sort=top&t=week&q=nsa+bitcoin
>
> https://hn.algolia.com/?sort=byPopularity&dateRange=pastWeek&query=nsa+bitcoin
>
> https://slashdot.org/index2.pl?fhfilter=nsa+bitcoin
>
> OAKSTAR MONKEYROCKET aka THUNDERISLAND
>
> "agency working to unmask Bitcoin users about six months before
>
> Ulbricht was arrested, and that it had worked to monitor Liberty
>
> Reserve around the same time"
>
> "American spies were also working to crack Liberty Reserve"
>
> "analysts have .. tracked down senders / receivers of Bitcoin"
>
> the agency was interested in surveilling some competing
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> cryptocurrencies, "Bitcoin is #1 priority,"
>
> "using this “browsing product,” which “the NSA can then exploit.”
>
> "These programs involve ventures with US companies."
>
> Staff travel to "Virginia partner / these extremely patriotic
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> business associates" highly cloaked.
>
> "
>
> Partner provided first/last name metadata... large influx of
>
> traffic... ftp process... causing disk space to fill up
>
> "
>
> Powers also used for traditional police work
>
> “other targeted users will include those... International / Organised
>
> Crime and Narcotics...Follow-The-Money" missions
>
> "
>
> cyber targets that utilize online e-currency services...
>
> There’s no elaboration on who is considered a “cyber target.”
>
> "
>
> "
>
> that the NSA would “launch an entire operation ... under false
>
> pretenses” just to track targets is “pernicious,” ... Such a practice
>
> could spread distrust of privacy software in general, particularly in
>
> areas like Iran where such tools are desperately needed by dissidents.
>
> This “feeds a narrative that the U.S. is untrustworthy,”
>
> "
>
> "Despite Bitcoin’s reputation for privacy... you should really lower
>
> your expectations of privacy on this network.”
>
> "
>
> financial privacy “is something that matters incredibly” to the
>
> Bitcoin community, and expects that “people who are privacy conscious
>
> will switch to privacy-oriented coins” after learning of the NSA’s
>
> work here.
>
> "
>
> "
>
> If the government’s criminal investigations secretly relied on NSA
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> spying, that would be a serious concern. Individuals facing criminal
>
> prosecution have a right to know how the government came by its
>
> evidence, so that they can challenge whether the government’s methods
>
> were lawful. That is a basic principle of due process. The government
>
> should not be hiding the true sources for its evidence in court by
>
> inventing a different trail.
>
> "
>
> https://theintercept.com/2017/11/30/nsa-surveillance-fisa-section-702/
>
> "
>
> Civil liberties advocates have long suspected that the Justice
>
> Department is underreporting Section 702 cases in order to limit court
>
> challenges to the controversial law. Some theorize that the government
>
> conceals Section 702 use through a process known as “parallel
>
> construction,” in which evidence obtained from the warrantless
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> surveillance authority is reobtained through traditional FISA
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> authorization, and the government only discloses the latter authority
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> in U.S. District Court. One defense lawyer referred to this practice
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> in a court filing as “laundering” Section 702 evidence.
>
> "
>
> “
>
> The government intercepts Americans’ emails and phone calls in vast
>
> quantities using this spying law and stores them in databases for
>
> years,” said Patrick Toomey, staff attorney for the American Civil
>
> Liberties Union’s National Security Project. “FBI agents around the
>
> country then go searching through that trove of data as a matter of
>
> course, including in domestic criminal investigations.
>
> "
>
> "
>
> If the FBI uses parallel construction to conceal intelligence
>
> community information, it would not be the only federal law
>
> enforcement agency doing so. In 2013, Reuters obtained documents from
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> the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration that showed how agents were
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> trained to “recreate” investigative trails to conceal how intelligence
>
> intercepts helped to identify criminal targets.
>
> "
>
>
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