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Re: [GSoC] Improving Snakes on a Tor

Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Sat, May 01, 2010 at 02:55:53PM -0700, Damian Johnson wrote:
An easy place to start would be to solicit input on or-talk for a better
definition and enumerable attributes we can look for. Some obvious starting
ones would be ssl stripping, certificate tampering (checking for differences
like the Perspectives addon [2]), and bad DNS responses. I'd imagine Scott
Bennett would be glad to jump in with some more ideas. :)

The balance here is between making use of imperfect exit resources that
people volunteer, and keeping the content you can reach through Tor


There is a separate arms race of detecting intentionally broken exits.
But imo that isn't really an arms race we can win with SoaT.

Thanks for clarifying that. I had (mistakenly) thought the latter was the purpose of the GSoC project.

The way
to do better at that one is to teach users and service providers about
end-to-end authentication and encryption.

From what I've seen I don't think there is any realistic hope for any significant number of web pages to be served with end-to-end encryption (not sure what your reference is to end-to-end authentication) in the foreseeable future.


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