On Wed, 11 May 2011 10:11:07 +0200 NGUYEN Quoc Viet <quocviet.pfiev@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > I'm now researching an attack against Tor. > > *Resume of Attack*: We control exit node and entry node. Upon receiving a > RELAY BEGIN cell,the exit node will forger a malicious webpage to client. > The webpage contains some empty gif files. The entry node will be able to > detect a distinctive pattern of the connection to that malicious webpage, > basing on number of relay cells backward and forward. If you can control both the entry and exit nodes, you don't even need to perform an active attack -- a purely passive timing attack will identify the client. That's why each Tor client selects a few relays to use as âentry guardsâ -- see <https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#EntryGuards> and <http://freehaven.net/anonbib/#hs-attack06>. > For implementation, it's needed to modify a piece of Tor source code at the > exit node, to forger a malicious webpage to client. Notice that this is not > modifying webpage response from the server, but forger attacker's webpage to > the client. Could some one please give a hint about where I need to modify. No. Robert Ransom
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