Hi tor guys, encrypted traffic analysis is an analysis apply to an encrypted session in order not to disclose the protected data, but to detect the protocol protected. the IRAN attack in TOR was, more or less, an attack like them. (more or less because was based on the HTTPS pattern, not in an analysis based on packets size and packets timing, anyway this is one possible next step in this challenge). anyway, yesterday has been released a tool (SniffJoke: http://www.delirandom.net/sniffjoke) transparently scramble the traffic outgoing from a Linux box and making nasty to be analyzed by a sniffer or other passive wiretapping tool. If someone interested in TOR deply, would: 1) try a blocked TOR version in IRAN, to verify if the session is protected from the anti-TOR tech 2) study a scrambling pattern, I will develop a specific sniffjoke plugin to protect eventually escalation in passive analysis from the attacker 3) tests sniffjoke as additional protection in an exit node, protecting from passive analysis the anonymized traffic 4) any other ideas :) I want to offer my supports cheers, vecna
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