Thus spake andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (andrew@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx): > On Mon, May 30, 2011 at 11:59:21PM -0400, grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx wrote 1.2K bytes in 32 lines about: > : you should seriously consider logging either: > : a) your own traffic (whether via internet or Tor) > : b) exit traffic > : c) both > : To cover your ass. At least this way you'll have some form of > : log you can present if needed to give more weight to an > : explanation. > > I am not a lawyer and this is not legal advice. However, after having > been involved in a number of these cases, the more data you give to the > police and courts, the more guilty you are in their eyes. > > There are plenty of places in this world where having something > encrypted is the equivalent of putting the data in a locked safe. You > can be compelled to decrypt the data. Prosecutors love data. Expanding on this, if the reason that your node was seized was because it transmitted something forbidden (leaked, classified, copyrighted, illegal, etc), having a copy of that material in your possession is just about the stupidest thing you could do. For most situations, this immediately makes you just as guilty as whoever first downloaded the material. Even if it is encrypted, your key material can be leaked, extracted, and/or compelled in many situations you probably have not thought about, or at least you certainly did not mention here. Beyond this, in the US, storing any communications data is also illegal with narrow exception: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00002511----000-.html What you are describing above is probably outside of the exceptions in (2)(a)(i) for US folks. The best answer is: Don't run exits co-mingled with your personal data or on home connections. -- Mike Perry Mad Computer Scientist fscked.org evil labs
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