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Re: [tor-talk] Anonymity of Leaking Servers (Was Re: [tor-dev] "Trawling for Tor Hidden Services: Detection, Measurement, Deanonymization")
----- Original Message -----
> Is that important for Strongbox? I don't think Strongbox's threat model
> needs the document upload server to *be* anonymous.
I can see why it would be important for preventing end to end correlation. Given the recent example of the massive grab of phone data from the DOJ, if they knew where the server was located and had suspects in mind, it would make end to end correlation a lot easier for the purposes of identifying a leaker. So, if the New Yorker is actually serious about preventing that, and regularly moved the keys around to different servers, they could stay ahead of governments looking to use end to end correlation by merely monitoring the New Yorker's site in addition to anyone they fear may leak data.
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