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Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth
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- Subject: Re: Reduce hops when privacy level allows to save Tor network bandwidth
- From: Erilenz <erilenz@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2009 04:47:37 -0500
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* on the Wed, Nov 18, 2009 at 12:08:10PM -0500, Marcus Griep wrote:
>> Yes, they should. However, just because people shouldn't be doing something
>> doesn't mean you should ignore the fact that they are.
> Responding to a deficiency in an area which Tor does not attempt to solve is
> a poor use of resources.
That's fine, as long as you're assuming that people only use Tor when they need
strong anonymity. As soon as you realise that people who don't need strong
anonymity are using it as well, your point fails. Whether or not they *should*
be doing so is irrelevant. The options are:
1.) Ignore that they're doing it
2.) Prevent them from doing it
3.) Make their impact smaller when they are doing it
I choose 3.
> "There are many use cases where that level of protection isn't required." --
> In that case, use a tool better suited to your goals.
Again. Whether or not people *should* be using Tor under these circumstances is
irrelevant. The point is, they are, and how to deal with it.
> Now, if you were interested in coding this piece, and you felt it a good use
> of your resources, then it might be worthwhile. However, remember that every
> choice given to the end user is a chance for the end user to make a bad or
> misinformed decision. Tor has bandwidth issues that come with multiple
> routing hops. Many users "just want Tor faster", but often are not savvy
> enough to understand that reducing the number of hops, even by one, severely
> limits the Tor's ability to hamper tracking efforts. As such many may choose
> to reduce their hops, and get faster usage, but falsely believe that just
> because it is still "Tor", they can't be tracked.
I prefer the concept of combining safe defaults with more choice. If people
are afraid for their life, they're not going to reduce the number of hops
from 3 to 2.
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