On 04/10/11 00:44, Nick Mathewson wrote: > It might be worthwhile to add a feature where each Tor server > generates a signed "permanent shutdown notice" at the same time it > generates its key, and to suggest to node operators that they keep a > copy of that notice someplace secure so that they can circulate it as > needed if they need to prove that they are saying this node has been > compromised. It'd probably need a design proposal. I'm not sure how > much of a win it is over the GPG solution above: it saves some steps, > but still requires you to make preparations in advance. It's a win in that it makes the procedure for revocation explicit at the beginning. Operators with less understanding of cryptography would most likely be grateful for having that spelled out. Julian -- 3072D/D2DE707D Julian Yon (2011 General Use) <pgp.2011@xxxxxx>
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