On 10/2/2013 7:00 AM, harmony wrote:
Why limit the randomization of browser characteristics or other data to just the timestamp?======================================================================== Tor Weekly News October 2nd, 2013 ======================================================================== On September 28th, Mike Perry released the fourth alpha of the new Tor Browser Bundle 3.0 series [1].... It also fixes a fingerprinting issue by randomizing the TIMESTAMP sent when establishing an HTTPS connection.
Why not randomize certain other data or browser characteristics (that wouldn't break functionality)? This goes back to my post containing the concept of it being easier to achieve chaos than perfection.
I'm not sure what would / wouldn't surely break some functionality; but things like user agent (or parts of it); time zone; randomly spoofing system fonts, even w/ Flash & Java disabled, etc. Or other things that are easy to randomize & aren't likely to break functionality.
-- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsusbscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk