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Re: [tor-talk] Tor and Google error / CAPTCHAs.
On 1 October 2016 at 16:10, <blobby@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> I didn't explain myself very well. With the proxychains tool (
> http://proxychains.sourceforge.net/) you can write something like:
- person uses tor to connect to socks proxy provider
- person authenticates (?) to socks proxy provider
- person traverses socks proxy prover to connect to end service
This sound like putting a condom on top of another condom after cutting a
hole in the first one, but hey, if you think it's worthwhile and fun, knock
yourself out. :-)
The problem is that the SOCKS IP itself may be "bad" (perhaps even as "bad"
> as an exit node IP) and hence Gmail, FB, etc, still discriminate (and hence
> demand additional proof).
Also that. Basically you are just shifting (say) Google's knowledge of
what IP address from
"possibly a Tor user, amongst all the spam that Tor emanates"
"traffic sourced from some shitty open (or authenticated?) random SOCKS
relay, who know what the fuck this is?"
In short, you're making <COMPANY'S> job of picking out good traffic from
bad, _way_ harder.
But, hey, maybe you're masochistic / sadistic / both? :-)
Since SOCKS IPs, like exit node IPs, can be selected by country and
> (sometimes) via city, it's possible to have an IP which is in the city in
> which the webmail or social network person resides.
Geolocation is not the only the only fruit, in the authentication fruit
salad; I even alluded to this in the original blogpost ("...appears to be
connecting from Australia at one moment may the next appear to be in Sweden
or Canada") - but with this comes the realisation that geolocation can be
faked to appear normal, too.
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