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Re: Exclude nodes from certain countries
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- Subject: Re: Exclude nodes from certain countries
- From: "Ringo Kamens" <2600denver@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sat, 15 Sep 2007 20:21:17 -0400
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My main criticism of pickaproxy is... why? Why do that when you can
program a tor controller to do exactly the same thing with a offline
database?
Comrade Ringo Kamens
On 9/15/07, misc <misc@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Sat, 15 Sep 2007 17:57:51 -0500 (CDT), Scott Bennett wrote:
>
> >
> > Why would they waste their time? They will have already gotten copies
> > of what they want as it traveled in the clear between its origin and the web
> > server. Remember the news articles a while back about all those snoop boxes
> > in the locked rooms at AT&T?
>
> > As noted above, if they want it, they will have already gotten it. The
> > only reason to bother the web site operator(s) is for the general purpose of
> > intimidation.
>
> Scott, anybody who is browsing to www.pickaproxy.com to use Tor there would
> OBVIOUSLY use SSL (https://www.pickaproxy.com). SSL support was the first
> thing I checked when I went onto their web-site. (If they didn't support
> SSL, I probably would not have even bothered replying to that post).
>
> The connection to www.pickaproxy.com would be encrypted with SSL, then the
> traffic would be decrypted at www.pickaproxy.com and redirected into their
> Tor client, where it would be re-encrypted. Therefore the ONLY party
> knowing the author IP and the contents of communication will be
> www.pickaproxy.com (unless you use anonymous proxy-chain to connect to
> www.pickaproxy.com).
>
> I'm aware of those ISP rooms sucking the traffic from internet backbones
> into N$A. So I can only imagine how much pressure this particular
> web-server operator will be under, if that's not a honeypot from the start.
>
>