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Re: [tor-talk] Question about possible increased risk of censorship when running (the same) Tor node as a relay and later as a bridge

Kostas Jakeliunas <kostas@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>Hi all,
>has there been any discussion/research whether Tor bridges are more likely
>to get blacklisted in censored areas if they'd been first run as simple
>internal relays? The idea being, if a censorship system is fishing for Tor
>nodes so they can be blacklisted on a per-IP-address basis and an internal
>relay later on becomes a bridge but is using the same external IP address,
>I suppose it is possible that it might get automatically blacklisted. Say
>I'm a censor and I'm blacklisting all IPs found in the published
>consensuses. I discover that someone is trying to connect to an IP
>previously found on a consensus (and I recall all previous IPs) - I do not
>do DPI - and simply block the connection due to IP address match. In this
>case, it doesn't matter if the bridge could be found via bridgeDB, or if
>it's doing pluggable transports. Any known cases/reports where this is
>likely to have happened?
>The reason I'm asking is, I've been running an internal Tor relay and am
>considering making it to be an obfsproxy bridge; it would be the same IP
>address. Perhaps this is inefficient, i.e. it is likely to have already
>been blacklisted in many censored/important areas? I suppose it's also an
>interesting question in itself, and it would be interesting to do some
>experiments e.g. using OONI.
>Thanks for any input
>tor-talk mailing list
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