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Re: [tor-bugs] #12585 [Tor]: Implement new option SocksSocket
#12585: Implement new option SocksSocket
-----------------------------+--------------------------------
Reporter: ioerror | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: needs_revision
Priority: normal | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.6.x-final
Component: Tor | Version: Tor: unspecified
Resolution: | Keywords: 026-triaged-1
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by ioerror):
Replying to [comment:43 nickm]:
>
> Throughout:
>
> * Looks nice! Much simpler now.
Agreed - a lot of refactoring that makes it easier to read!
>
> - This is probably gonna break on windows: I don't think they have
AF_UNIX, and at least address.c uses AF_UNIX unconditionally. I can clean
it up if you want, or you can if you've got mingw cross-compilation stuff
installed.
I think it would be great if anyone with Windows could make this work. It
would remove lots of local firewall issues, I think. I think the proper
way to implement it would be to use a named pipe (
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/windows/desktop/aa365590%28v=vs.85%29.aspx ) and it would
effectively be the same feature.
>
> - Is "SocksSocket" really the right name for this? I'm used to it,
but I bet it would confuse users some.
I'm partial to the name but I'm open to bikesheds. :-) Other thoughts on
names:
SocksPipe
SocksSocket
SocksUnixSocket
PipeProxy
PipeSocksTransport
SocksFile
SocksSandbox
Any other ideas welcome :)
>
> address.c
>
> - Probably should document how to work with unix domain sockets;
> they don't actually fit in a tor_addr_t.
>
> config.c / tor.1.txt
>
> - Can we support SocksSocket on-by-default? If so we'd need a way
> to turn it off. "SocksSocket 0"?
I think if we can enable SocksSocket by default, we'd want a way to turn
it off, yes. Perhaps a totally new option? Perhaps we want to have a
different ticket for enabling it by default where we add a SocksSocket
kill switch?
>
> connection.c:
>
> - I wonder if we should try fchmod first, and then chmod. fchmod
> is a bit safer, right? (Not a new issue.)
I'm not familiar with this - Andrea, any thoughts?
>
> - If we chmod 0660 in the event of a group-writable socket, should
> we shmod 0600 in the event of a non-group-writable socket?
> (Not a new issue.)
Same as above.
>
> - The foosocketsgroupwriteable code in connection_listener_new
> seems to be nearly duplicated.
>
Yes, I think that is true
> - This comment is wrong:
> {{{
> /* For now only control ports can be Unix domain sockets
> * and listeners at the same time */
> }}}
> connection_edge.c:
>
> - What's the point of the modifications of
> connection_ap_get_begincell_flags and
> connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach ? I think they might
> be wrong. The flags that they adjust are about whether the
> destination address is IPv4/IPv6/etc, not whether the socksport
> address is IPv4 or IPv6.
Interesting. I think this is a mistake, then.
>
> relay.c:
>
> - Same comment as comment above, wrt the change in
> connection_edge_process_relay_cell_not_open().
>
Perhaps a second bug? Andrea - what do you think?
>
> Otherwise, looks okay. Have we tested the latest version of this? :)
I haven't tested the latest version. I'd like to get the final patch ready
for testing and then I'll gladly test it. Though I suspect it would be
*really* useful if someone else *also* tested it and confirmed it worked.
Especially on OS X!
In some kind of ideal world, I like the idea of shipping TBB with Firefox
completely sandboxed from making TCP/IP connection on two of our three
platforms. The third one being windows, of course. I guess that depends on
discovering if NamedPipes will work or not.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12585#comment:44>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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