[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #20994 [Metrics/Onionoo]: invalid first_seen timestamp on bridges
#20994: invalid first_seen timestamp on bridges
-----------------------------+------------------------------
Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: metrics-team
Type: defect | Status: merge_ready
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Metrics/Onionoo | Version:
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
-----------------------------+------------------------------
Changes (by iwakeh):
* status: needs_review => merge_ready
Comment:
Replying to [comment:5 karsten]:
> Replying to [comment:4 iwakeh]:
> > The reasoning in comment:3 makes sense; the code seems to do what is
suggested, but test(s) missing.
>
> Cool, thanks for looking! There are indeed no tests for this class.
But I'm afraid it's a small project to start writing tests for this class
now, and that shouldn't block the bugfix.
Hmm, I prefer having a coded proof of the fix. It doesn't seem such a
huge task from merely looking at the class.
Well, I'll add a ticket for writing this test.
>
> > Couldn't there also be relays affected, b/c of the cached descriptor
imports?
>
> Good question. The answer is that relays are not affected, because
`processRelayServerDescriptor()` did ''not'' contain a line
`this.updatedNodes.add(fingerprint);` as it was contained in
`processBridgeServerDescriptor()`. We only put relay fingerprints into
that set that we saw in consensuses, and that's how they all got valid
`first_seen` timestamps.
>
> So, good to merge?
Given that you're currently system-testing this fix (by re-importing) ok.
Ready for merge.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/20994#comment:6>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs