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Re: [tor-bugs] #3375 [Tor Client]: NEWNYM does not abandon open rendezvous circuits
#3375: NEWNYM does not abandon open rendezvous circuits
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Reporter: rransom | Owner: rransom
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: critical | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.1.x-final
Component: Tor Client | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by rransom):
Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
> Looks like a plausible idea to me.
>
> Do we want to be using the same MaxCircuitDirtiness for rendezvous
circuits? It seems that this change would make us not only abandon
circuits on newnym, but reintroduce to any hidden service that we want to
stay connected to every MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds (current default 10
min, I think).
A rendezvous circuit's `timestamp_dirty` is reset every time a stream is
attached to it, so this change would only cause clients to reintroduce to
a hidden service if they had a long-lived stream open and had not opened a
new stream to the HS in the last 10 minutes. (If they don't have a long-
lived stream open, Tor will currently close the circuit 10 minutes after
the last time a stream was attached to it) I don't see a problem with
using a new circuit in that case, and it may be beneficial (e.g. for
reliability reasons).
> Is changing circuit_is_acceptable sufficient? That is, will the having
this circuit present but non-usable cause new introduction attempts to be
made correctly, or will new attempts to connect to the hidden service fail
while it's around?
When I tested this patch, a new attempt to connect to a hidden service
after NEWNYM succeeded (in refetching the descriptor, reintroducing to the
HS, and building and using a second rendezvous circuit).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3375#comment:3>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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