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Re: [tor-bugs] #3375 [Tor Client]: NEWNYM does not abandon open rendezvous circuits
#3375: NEWNYM does not abandon open rendezvous circuits
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Reporter: rransom | Owner: rransom
Type: defect | Status: needs_review
Priority: critical | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.1.x-final
Component: Tor Client | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by nickm):
Replying to [comment:3 rransom]:
> Replying to [comment:2 nickm]:
> > Looks like a plausible idea to me.
> >
> > Do we want to be using the same MaxCircuitDirtiness for rendezvous
circuits? It seems that this change would make us not only abandon
circuits on newnym, but reintroduce to any hidden service that we want to
stay connected to every MaxCircuitDirtiness seconds (current default 10
min, I think).
>
> A rendezvous circuit's `timestamp_dirty` is reset every time a stream is
attached to it,
Ow. This gives timestamp_dirty a different meaning for rendezvous
circuits than for general circuits, where (unless I'm mistaken) only the
first stream getting attached causes the circuit timestamp_dirty to get
set.
> so this change would only cause clients to reintroduce to a hidden
service if they had a long-lived stream open and had not opened a new
stream to the HS in the last 10 minutes. (If they don't have a long-lived
stream open, Tor will currently close the circuit 10 minutes after the
last time a stream was attached to it) I don't see a problem with using a
new circuit in that case, and it may be beneficial (e.g. for reliability
reasons).
I think that's _probably_ ok too, but it's definitely a behavior change,
and as such I'm not too thrilled about having it in 0.2.1.x.
Roger, what do you think about this?
> > Is changing circuit_is_acceptable sufficient? That is, will the
having this circuit present but non-usable cause new introduction attempts
to be made correctly, or will new attempts to connect to the hidden
service fail while it's around?
>
> When I tested this patch, a new attempt to connect to a hidden service
after NEWNYM succeeded (in refetching the descriptor, reintroducing to the
HS, and building and using a second rendezvous circuit).
Great.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3375#comment:4>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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