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[tor-bugs] #3420 [Tor Client]: Add some way for starting-up controllers to disable non-controller networking until Tor is running.
#3420: Add some way for starting-up controllers to disable non-controller
networking until Tor is running.
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Reporter: nickm | Owner:
Type: enhancement | Status: new
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.3.x-final
Component: Tor Client | Version:
Keywords: | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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This is the the successor ticket to #2355 , which proved on experience not
to be the greatest idea (see #3354 and #3419 for more info).
The original goal as I understand it was to provide some way for a
controller to launch Tor such that it won't make outgoing network
connections until the controller has told it to, so that the controller
has a chance to ask Tor whether it wants to use
One proposed options for doing this was a __DontUseTheNetwork option that
would keep Tor from opening any non-controller listeners and from making
any outgoing connections. See #2355 for more info on motivation here.
(There have been other proposals too, including an as-yet-unnamed, hard-
to-specify option that would make should_delay_dir_fetches() return true.
[The effect there would be to prevent any connections except those to
fetch bridge descriptors, I think.])
The main prospective user for this option is T(A)ILS , so we should make
sure that any proposed option would do what T(A)ILS needs before we run
off and build it.
I'm opening this as an enhancement request against 0.2.3.x, since we're so
late in the 0.2.2.x release process, but if whatever we do here turns out
to be small enough and easy enough to backport, we should consider it a
backport candidate for 0.2.3.x.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3420>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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