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Re: [tor-bugs] #5170 [Tor]: crypto_pk_get_digest (et al.?) use i2d_RSAPublicKey obsoletely
#5170: crypto_pk_get_digest (et al.?) use i2d_RSAPublicKey obsoletely
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Reporter: rransom | Owner:
Type: defect | Status: needs_revision
Priority: trivial | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.5.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Keywords: easy tor-client | Parent:
Points: | Actualpoints:
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Comment(by marek):
Replying to [comment:7 nickm]:
> IMO it's okay to remove id_to_fp.c in 0.2.5 if it's not even compiled.
I've updated the patch.
> The "return -1" cases need to free the buffer if the buffer is non-NULL.
Thanks. I got it wrong in one place, but except for that I disagree.
Although the specific behaviour is undocumented, if I can read the openssl
sources that's the relevant code:
https://github.com/majek/openssl/blob/2f58cda4ce45c88f5c1d284eb155cbc9bcf4705f/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c#L111
Which reads: `buf` will only be !=NULL If returned `len` >=0. IE: we don't
need to free `buf` when `len` is -1.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/5170#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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