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Re: [tor-bugs] #29570 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enforce mutually exclusive logic for IPv6 ORPort flags
#29570: Enforce mutually exclusive logic for IPv6 ORPort flags
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Reporter: s7r | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor:
| unspecified
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor:
| unspecified
Severity: Normal | Resolution:
Keywords: tor-relay, ipv6, reachability, | Actual Points:
needs-proposal-or-tor-dev-email |
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by AVee):
Replying to [comment:14 s7r]:
We're running in circles here. You don't need to explain IPv6 to me, I've
had native IPv6 since 2011 and tunnels before that. You don't need to
argue the case that IPv6 is intended to bring full end-to-end connectivity
back, I agree and would love to see that happen.
> In IPv6 however, this is not the case. In addition that this is not the
case, it is also NOT RECOMMENDED by any RFC to do this. With what you are
saying, just because you think it's ok "as long as it works and the relay
is willing to do it" you contradict all the RFCs.
Let me quote an RFC then:
4. SHOULD NOT This phrase, or the phrase "NOT RECOMMENDED" mean that
there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances when the
particular behavior is acceptable or even useful, but the full
implications should be understood and the case carefully weighed
before implementing any behavior described with this label.
https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt
We should stick to that. We must not make it impossible to do this as
'there may exist valid reasons in particular circumstances' to do this.
And even if you feel no valid reason could ever exist, Tor is not the IPv6
police so it still isn't up to us to enforce anything there.
The proof of the pudding is in the eating. We have one example of this
config. It may not be optimal, it may be utterly different from how I
would have done it. But it worked, therefore it is valid, therefore it
should be allowed.
(On a more philosophical note, I feel it would be counter productive as
well. You add extra barriers to people trying to get a Tor relay running
as well as for people trying to get experience with IPv6. Allowing them to
do it in a sub-optimal way and learn from that is far more useful then
trying to force them to get it right the first time around.)
> Why would you want to pretend to listen on an IPv6 address if you have
no open socket for it?
The Tor man page explains that nicely (emphasis mine):
NoListen:
By default, we bind to a port and tell our users about it. If
NoListen is specified, we don't bind, but advertise anyway. This
can be useful **if something else (for example, a firewall's port
forwarding configuration) is causing connections to reach us.**
In this case HAProxy was the 'something else'...
> All this ticket recommends is, if you are willing to set an IPv6
NoListen address, also set a NoAdvertise one, if you're willing to
redirect and tunnel that somehow it's still OK but at least don't
advertise an address class if you have no listening socket for it.
So the if someone uses HAProxy (or anything else) to redirect IPv6 traffic
to IPv4 he should configure his node to still listen on a IPv6 port even
though it will never see any traffic?
> All this because something we say in the manual (mutually exclusive
flags for torrc options) are not properly sanitized at start-up.
I guess you refer to this phrase in the man page:
For obvious reasons, NoAdvertise and NoListen are mutually exclusive,
...
That only states a {{{ORPort}}} line that sets {{{NoAdvertise}}} cannot
also set {{{NoListen}}} (and vice-versa). This rule was not violated in
the config in question.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29570#comment:17>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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