[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]
Re: [tor-bugs] #33131 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: buf->datalen >= 0x7fffffff
#33131: Bug: buf->datalen >= 0x7fffffff
--------------------------+------------------------------------
Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: needs_revision
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.4.2.5
Severity: Minor | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: nickm | Sponsor:
--------------------------+------------------------------------
Changes (by nickm):
* status: needs_review => needs_revision
Comment:
Hm. That does seem like a good start. If we're going to merge it, I'd
suggest some changes:
* We need a changes file.
* Logging a warning here would get extremely loud -- we probably
shouldn't be doing that without a rate-limiter.
* If we do want to log size_t values, we should be using TOR_PRIuSZ, not
just casting to long.
* The value of CONN_INBUF_MAX would make more sense if it were based on
some value exposed by buffers.h.
* A test here would be helpful too.
More broadly, though: if this behavior is the logical consequence of
setting a very high bandwidth, should we disallow setting the bandwidth
that high, or issue a warning if people try to do so?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33131#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
_______________________________________________
tor-bugs mailing list
tor-bugs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-bugs