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Re: [tor-bugs] #33131 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: buf->datalen >= 0x7fffffff
#33131: Bug: buf->datalen >= 0x7fffffff
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Reporter: cypherpunks | Owner: (none)
Type: defect | Status: needs_revision
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.4.4.x-final
Component: Core Tor/Tor | Version: Tor: 0.4.2.5
Severity: Minor | Resolution:
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: nickm | Sponsor:
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Comment (by cypherpunks):
Redid the branch a bit. Not sure how to test it.
Replying to [comment:8 nickm]:
Yeah, the logging shouldn't be in the final version. It would just help to
confirm which number is the one that's extremely high: at_most, or
buf->datalen.
Logging would definitely be too loud, considering #31036 and #32022.
(Historical note, this
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/commit/?id=ee5471f9aab55269c8c480f1f90dfeb08803ac15
particular check] was added in #21369.)
So the high burst value, which becomes `at_most` later, is set in
`connection_or_update_token_buckets_helper`. Doesn't it comes from the
`BandwidthBurst` option, not `BandwidthRate`?
As long as we add this sanity check, is there a problem with keeping this
behavior of using that high value from the user's configuration? `at_most`
serves as an upper bound on what can be read from the socket in one go, so
it has to be limited by something like `BUF_MAX_LEN`, but the burst limit
in the token bucket doesn't have to be limited by that. The burst limit
persists across multiple calls to `connection_handle_read()` (and any
draining of `inbuf` in between calls).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33131#comment:9>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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