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[tor-bugs] #17592 [Tor]: Clean up connection timeout logic
#17592: Clean up connection timeout logic
---------------------------+--------------------------------
Reporter: mikeperry | Owner: mikeperry
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: Medium | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component: Tor | Version:
Severity: Normal | Keywords:
Actual Points: | Parent ID: #16861
Points: | Sponsor:
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In #6799, it was decided to keep TLS connections open for a random amount
of time after they are idle, to defend against an attack that used
internal Tor network connectivity information to determine Guard nodes
(Slides:
https://www.cryptolux.org/images/8/85/ESORICS-2012-Presentation-2.pdf
Paper: https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/432.pdf).
Unfortunately, this logic (in connection_or_set_canonical()) is kind of a
mess. Relays and clients are treated the same, and client connections are
also kept alive for an additional hour by predictive circuit building even
when otherwise idle, where as relays are not.
If we treat relays and clients separately for this timeout, we could
reduce total client keep-alive time significantly (down to 30 minutes or
so), and significantly increase relay connection lifetime. This should
result in reduced total connection counts on relays, with better defenses
against Torscan.
This is also needed in order to put reasonable bounds on padding overhead
in #16861 for mobile clients. Furthermore, aside from the wieners running
middle relays behind junky home routers who will whine about connection
overflow, having a more well-connected Tor network is a good idea for many
reasons (not just Torscan).
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17592>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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