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Re: [tor-bugs] #1912 [Tor Client]: Choosing bridges by bw is problematic



#1912: Choosing bridges by bw is problematic
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------
 Reporter:  Sebastian   |       Owner:  nickm             
     Type:  defect      |      Status:  needs_review      
 Priority:  normal      |   Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.2.x-final
Component:  Tor Client  |     Version:                    
 Keywords:              |      Parent:                    
------------------------+---------------------------------------------------

Comment(by arma):

 17:43 < nickm> Also, since we distribute bridges uniformly (rather than by
                bandwidth) I am not sure we are doing balancing at all well

 Yes, that's the issue.

 Some people have very few bridges -- in that case, any bridge they use
 should be good enough for them, and this bug isn't relevant for them.

 But some people have several bridges, and they should tend to use the ones
 that claim to be faster.

 I think we're mixing together multiple bugs here. One of them is:

 >Use just one bridge with capacity 0, bug #1805 is triggered but things
 work. Add another (working) bridge to the set with a capacity != 0: We
 never choose the bridge with capacity 0.

 So far so good.

 >Make the bridge with capacity != 0 nonworking: The Tor client breaks,
 because it wants to use the bridge with capacity. It doesn't try the other
 bridge, because it has a weight of 0."

 Is that really happening? If it is, it's a bug that we should fix. The fix
 is not to start weighting bridges differently. It's to make Tor notice
 when a bridge has broken.

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/1912#comment:10>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
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