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Re: [tor-bugs] #17031 [Ponies]: hardware tor relay
#17031: hardware tor relay
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Reporter: elypter | Owner:
Type: task | Status: new
Priority: normal | Milestone:
Component: Ponies | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords:
Actual Points: | Parent ID:
Points: |
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Comment (by elypter):
Replying to [comment:6 cypherpunks]:
> A very large number of attacks is non-destructive and will leave no
traces of tampering (e.g. power/timing/RF analysis, fault injection, ...).
Do some research on side channel attacks.
against rf analysis you could use a jammer. power, timing and fault
injection sound to me like exploiting implementation weaknesses.
you wouldnt say its theoretically impossible to make tor secure because
there have been many cases of attackers using buffer overflows is programs
that are written in c either.
i dont say its easy to harden the hardware but so is software.
even though this doesnt seem feasable and the best solution today we dont
know what will happen in the future. maybe open decentralized hardware is
the future. or maybe usa and china will start a hardware trojan arms race
and no hardware can be trusted anymore.
looking at all this stuff, uefi, datacenter infiltration, binary blobs
maybe the focus should really first an open secure platform before looking
at a closed secure one. tor only works under the assumption that most
participants care about opsec. the best defense against network
adversaries is worth nothing if the platform can be attacked.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17031#comment:7>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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