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Re: [tor-bugs] #7349 [Tor]: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
#7349: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
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Reporter: asn | Owner: isis
Type: project | Status: assigned
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.???
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-bridge SponsorZ tor-pt
Actual Points: | proposal-needed 028-triage
Points: 9000+ | Parent ID:
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Comment (by yawning):
Replying to [comment:13 isis]:
> Replying to [comment:12 elypter]:
> > why not ditch the orport alltogether. if all relays communicate over
pluggable transports then active probing will become obsolete.
>
> This is about making the ORPort "ditchable". However, it is ''not''
about making bridges communicate to the next hop over PTs, since that
would reveal that they are a bridge (and thus nullify most of the work I
did for #7144).
It's also pointless extra overhead, unless we're talking about using a PT
protocol instead of TLS. At the moment this would be a horrible idea
because the closest thing to a PT protocol that provides the reuired
security properties is `obfs4`, and it wasn't designed as a TLS
replacement.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7349#comment:19>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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