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Re: [tor-bugs] #7349 [Tor]: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
#7349: Obfsbridges should be able to "disable" their ORPort
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Reporter: asn | Owner: isis
Type: project | Status: assigned
Priority: major | Milestone: Tor: 0.2.???
Component: Tor | Version:
Resolution: | Keywords: tor-bridge SponsorZ tor-pt
Actual Points: | proposal-needed 028-triage
Points: 9000+ | Parent ID:
| Sponsor:
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Comment (by elypter):
Replying to [comment:13 isis]:
> This is about making the ORPort "ditchable". However, it is ''not''
about making bridges communicate to the next hop over PTs, since that
would reveal that they are a bridge (and thus nullify most of the work I
did for #7144).
when i wrote this ia assumd that pluggable transports are being used that
require a pass code so that active pobing would only be possible if the
attacker already knows the bridge. a bridge guard only adds additional
(bridge)security just like with a disabled or port.
Replying to [comment:19 yawning]:
>pointless extra overhead
in the current state of western governments yes, tor is kind of tolerated
but the ice is middle thick. however trusting in the status quo of the
internet seems to be a rather risky security model in long term. there
doesnt even have to be an evil government censor overlord. it could be
enough if isps throttle down tor connections for "traffic optimization"
and the goverment looks away. and yes ips are still public but there is
not only a technical side to censorship there is also a legal one
especially in democracies. ratelimiting or blocking specific pattern
shapes might be perfectly legal while blocking ips is not.
"ditching or port alltogether" was a bit provocative.
what i wanted to promote was that the nodes should be able to choose their
transport freely so the network can adapt to its environment.
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7349#comment:20>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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