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Re: [tor-bugs] #31512 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Fingerprinting of Tor Browser
#31512: Fingerprinting of Tor Browser
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Reporter: thelamper | Owner: tbb-team
Type: enhancement | Status: closed
Priority: Medium | Milestone:
Component: Applications/Tor Browser | Version:
Severity: Major | Resolution: invalid
Keywords: | Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
Reviewer: | Sponsor:
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Comment (by thelamper):
Both of those fingerprinting tests (brax.me/geo/) and (tor.triop.se/) fail
with javascript disabled ie they cannot generate a 'unique identifying
number'.
Does having javascript disabled make it harder to fingerprint individual
Tor users ie it reduces the data leaked by the user's browser to the
website in question? The panopticlick and amiunique tests suggest that
disabling JS helps users blend in with the crowd by reducing their
uniqueness.
Or is it generally viewed by the Tor Project as safe (ie non-
fingerprintable) for Tor users to browse the web with javascript enabled?
--
Ticket URL: <https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/31512#comment:8>
Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki <https://trac.torproject.org/>
The Tor Project: anonymity online
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