Re: [tor-dev] Proposal 247: Alternate Path Lengths

[George Kadianakis <desnacked@xxxxxxxxxx>]

Mike Perry <mikeperry@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> writes:

> While discussing proposal 247 with George yesterday, we realized that we
> still get security benefit from additional ephemeral hops beyond the
> vanguards themselves.
>
> Recall the high-level 247 path design is:
>
>   C - L - M - S -- S - M - L - H
>
> Where:
>   C = Client
>   L = Long lived Layer1 guard
>   M = Medium lifespan Layer2 guard
>   S = Short lifespan Layer3 guard
>   H = Hidden Service (or hsdir)
>   E = Ephemeral Hop (used below)
>   I = Intro Point (used below)
>   R = Rend Point (used below)
>

Hm, that's not entirely true. Currently prop247 only changes hidden service
path selection. It does _not_ change hidden service _client_ path selection as
described above. This is a new thing.

From talking to Mike, he suggests that clients should use vanguards as well to
defend against client guard discovery attacks from HSDirs or intro points. Also
he believes that having symmetry on circuits (both sides using vanguards) is
something we want.

I have mixed feelings about this.

- If client guard discovery is the main reason we are doing this, I think we
  should first look into these guard discovery vectors individually and figure
  out how concerning they are and if there is anything else we can do to block
  them, before complicating path selection even more.

- Also, I like symmetry myself, but I wouldn't change path selection and
  security just for that _if I can help it_.

> The benefit to just one more hop is easiest to see in the Introduction
> Point case, where George and I reasoned that it probably is a good idea
> to pick an intro point that is not the same as the Layer3 (S) set,
> otherwise the hidden service is effectively publishing its Layer3 guards
> in its descriptor, and using those same nodes to connect to rendezvous
> points. Clients probably also do not want the multi-visit linkability of
> using their layer3 vanguards to directly connect to an HS intro point.
> This means the intro circuit becomes:
>
>   C - L - M - S - E -- I - S - M - L - H
>
> Similarly, in the rend case, hidden services probably do not want to
> expose their Layer3 (S) guards quite so easily to a client's chosen
> Rendezvous Point, and again, the client probably does not want to use
> their Layer3 (S) guards as its Rendezvous point, to avoid visit
> linkability. This means we again have 8 hops for rends:
>
>   C - L - M - S - R -- E - S - M - L - H
>
>
> Unfortunately, this is starting to get ridiculous. While there are clear
> security benefits here, I think 8 hops is definitely at the point where
> we can forget about voice and other interactive traffic behaving
> reasonably. So what could we cut, if we wanted to?
>
> Well, going back to the Prop247 threat model, we want the adversary to
> perform at least two attacks: a Sybil and one or mode node compromise
> attacks. So maybe we can (in some cases, or optionally?) eliminate the M
> nodes from the path. Since the linkability risks may be acceptable for
> some applications, maybe we can also optionally allow clients or servers
> to omit the ephemeral hop. This basically gives us three options for
> path lengths. Let's consider each path type:
>
>
> Hsdir post/fetch:
>   1. C - L - M - S - E - H
>   2. C - L - S - E - H
>   3. C - L - S - H
>
> Intro:
>   1. C - L - M - S - E -- I   - S - M - L - H
>   2. C - L - S - E     -- I   - S - L - H
>  *3. C - L - S         -- I&S - L - H     (* IP Intersection attack!)
>
> Rend:
>   1. C - L - M - S - R -- E - S - M - L - H
>   2. C - L - S - R     -- E - S - L - H
>   3. C - L - R&S       -- S - L - H
>

What is R&S is here? Clients use static short-lifespan rendezvous points?

>
> Looking at these, we can see that we sacrifice the middle guards in the
> second option, which will come at the cost of one less compromise attack
> (but still the need to compromise the long-lived guard). We also lose
> the unlinkability in the third option, and this actually bites us in
> Intro 3: the hidden service L guard can perform a long-term intersection
> attack, watching for published intro points and matching that to the
> circuits that H makes to them. So that path length probably should not
> be used.
>

Hm, not sure what should be done here.

If we are actually worrying about HSDir/IP guard discovery attacks, my
intuition tells me to take the most conservative approach on HSDir/IP circuits
(so maybe do (1) and use vanguards and an extra ephemeral node), but leave the
rendezvous circuits as they are now (so that they remain 7 hops). Maybe like
this: "C - L - S - R -- S - L - H" or maybe without any vanguards at all :/

I think an extra hop on HSDir and intro circuits is not that terrible, but
extra hops on rendezvous circuits _might_ make performance visibly worse.

However, I still have mixed feelings about changing client path selection as
part of proposal 247:

- My main issue is that I think figuring out the right client path selection
  will require a _heavy_ amount of security analysis that will delay prop247
  even more.  I was hoping that we could treat the client-side as an orthogonal
  problem and tackle it in the future separately. But maybe I'm totally wrong
  and should be more patient and these two problems should be handled together.

- If the above changes only happen to HS circuits, we make it harder to make HS
  circuits indistinguishable from normal circuits on the face of traffic
  analysis. But maybe we have already lost this game.

- Also, not sure how the load balancing will work here. It's one thing having
  30k hidden services change their path selection, and another thing having 1
  million clients change it. If we make it opt-in for clients, who is going to
  enable it? Probably only very few paranoid people, or maybe only Ricochet
  users.

> But what about the others? Especially that Rend case? I really like the
> security properties of the full 8 hop paths, but it seems to me that for
> highly-interactive applications, we can provide the option for users to
> give up some of the unlinkability in exchange for that 4 hop circuit,
> which might actually allow for e2e hidden service voice and video to
> have a shot at working. Are there any risks with paths this short for
> that case?
>
> Does it make sense to provide users with these different path length and
> latency options? I'm thinking that the service could list its preferred
> path length in its hsdesc, and the client could override that as it
> chooses (either for more or less security). Is that dangerous? We were
> already considering letting users choose their guard set sizes. Why not
> path lengths also (or instead)?
>

4-hop rendezvous circuits might be acceptable for some use cases. Maybe even
for most use cases, I'm not really sure.

There is definitely some difference between requiring two compromise attacks
and requiring a single compromise attack to deanonimize a target, but I'm not
sure how big the difference is.

Also, I'm concerned about all the various linkability and intersection attacks
that appear when we reduce the path length.

In general, I'm not sure how to make this security difference clear to users
who enable the opt-in 4-hop rendezvous circuit feature. But maybe there is a
way.

All in all, more thinking is required here :)
_______________________________________________
tor-dev mailing list
tor-dev@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-dev