On Thu, 9 Jun 2011 21:34:17 +0000 Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 8:40 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > > Some thoughts from a quasi network operator... > > > > Perhaps a tracking reason not to do this... > > > > Normally exit traffic is free to travel the globe across jurisdictions > > on its way to its final destination (ie: webserver). Doing this > > forces that traffic to sink at the exit jurisdiction... removing > > that part of its independence. > > > > > No, it does not change anything except adding more exiting bandwidth to the > network. People who otherwise would run a middle node are willing to endure > Tor connections *to their own netblocks* from their own Tor nodes. That will > only improve things and it does not aide in tracking and Tor will still use > three hop circuits... No. Three hops are enough for normal Tor circuits because in a three-hop circuit, although the second hop knows some information about the client (one of its guard nodes) and the third hop knows the destination, no single hop has useful information about both. When a client's choice of exit node leaks useful information about its intended destination, as it does when using an âexit enclaveâ and would when using an exit node that exits to a small number of destinations. Robert Ransom
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