Re: [tor-dev] Tor and BGP integration

On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 10:23 PM, Robert Ransom <rransom.8774@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

On Thu, 9 Jun 2011 21:34:17 +0000
Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> On Thu, Jun 9, 2011 at 8:40 PM, grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> > Some thoughts from a quasi network operator...
> >
> > Perhaps a tracking reason not to do this...
> >
> > Normally exit traffic is free to travel the globe across jurisdictions
> > on its way to its final destination (ie: webserver). Doing this
> > forces that traffic to sink at the exit jurisdiction... removing
> > that part of its independence.
> >
> >
> No, it does not change anything except adding more exiting bandwidth to the
> network. People who otherwise would run a middle node are willing to endure
> Tor connections *to their own netblocks* from their own Tor nodes. That will
> only improve things and it does not aide in tracking and Tor will still use
> three hop circuits...

No.

Three hops are enough for normal Tor circuits because in a three-hop
circuit, although the second hop knows some information about the
client (one of its guard nodes) and the third hop knows the
destination, no single hop has useful information about both. When a
client's choice of exit node leaks useful information about its
intended destination, as it does when using an ‘exit enclave’ and would
when using an exit node that exits to a small number of destinations.

Sure but this in no way changes the picture. It's not like exit enclaving at all, except that it encourages nodes that would otherwise reject *:* to accept some exiting traffic. There would be no change to the way that the Tor client builds the circuit; this is just a way to encourage network operators (who want to play nice) to run more than a middle node without a lot of overhead. Or do I misunderstand?

All the best,

Jake