Re: [tor-dev] What's the explanation for weekly cycles in user graphs?

[David Fifield <david@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, Mar 18, 2015 at 12:41:55PM +0100, Philipp Winter wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 17, 2015 at 06:09:00PM -0700, David Fifield wrote:
> > You can eyeball more examples in the omni-graph:
> > https://people.torproject.org/~dcf/graphs/relays-all.pdf
> 
> That's a really useful overview!  It would be great if we could include
> that on the metrics page.

Here is the source code:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2014-October/007697.html

> > Is there a usual story we tell to explain what's happening? A few
> > hypotheses:
> >  * People use Tor at work to get their job done (work firewall blocks
> >    sites they need).
> >  * People use Tor at work to goof off.
> >  * People are relaxing and partying on the weekends, not sitting in
> >    front of a computer.
> >  * People don't have good Internet at home, so they use it more at work
> >    (and Tor use just correlates with Internet use).
> 
> It looks like many of these patterns started emerging after the big
> botnet spike.  It might be caused by infected office computers whose
> owners don't know that Tor is running and who tend to turn off their
> computers over the weekend.  There are probably also infected home
> computers that tend to be used only over the weekend.  That wouldn't
> explain the meek-specific pattern, though, because the botnet only used
> vanilla Tor as far as I know.

That's a good observation about the botnet. But I agree, it seems like
too much at this point for a malware author to start building in
pluggable transports, especially one that's only easily usable with Tor
Browser at this point.

> Apparently several countries such as Ethiopia and Uzbekistan had these
> weekly patterns for a long time, even before the botnet.  These
> countries have a rather small user base and the few users might only use
> Tor in an office setting, like you said.

I wonder if it correlates with censored-ness. I.e., people using Tor for
circumvention more than anonymity. Uzbekistan and Ethiopia are both "not
free" in the Freedom House 2014 summary:
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202014%20Summary%20of%20Findings.pdf

David Fifield
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