Re: [tor-relays] Help the Tor Project by running a fast unpublished bridge

[tor-admin <tor-admin@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On Monday, August 13. 2012, 00:55:45 Roger Dingledine wrote:
> This discussion really goes back to a simple question: is it better to
> use our funding for more design and development, or for strengthening
> the network? For exit relays, I think choosing "strengthen the network"
> is a great and worthwhile experiment. But for bridges, since the current
> Tor transport and current bridge distribution strategies are not great,
> I think it's better to use funding for better designs and better code.
> I should note that I actually encouraged VoA to want unpublished bridges:
> if we set up fast bridges and published them via bridges.torproject.org
> today, they'd get blocked quickly in China.
> 
My understanding of bridge detection was, that Chinas GFW is able to detect 
the Tor SSL handshake and does active bridge probing after a successful 
connection to a (for the GFW) unknown bridge IP. So they should be able to 
block any bridge publish or unpublished very quickly, if someone from behind 
the GFW connects to a bridge. Am I missing something?

Regards,

torland

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