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Re: [tor-relays] My Relay has slowed significantly.

But if you constantly switch guard nodes then chances are that very soon you will use at the same time two compromised nodes, probably revealing which sites you visit. Also Tor users usually use Tor to visit specific sites, not generally browse the web, so even if someone peeks into their circuits once, he can get a good idea of what the user uses Tor for. So fixing the guard nodes means that either no one peeks into your circuits or that someone peeks constantly into your circuits (well 1/3rd of them) for a long time, which is not really worse than peeking for a day into them.

I don't follow tor-talk.

I wouldn't mind of course having the option of excluding your node from the guard position.

-----
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On Sun, Feb 3, 2013 at 4:42 PM, Roman Mamedov <rm@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Sun, 3 Feb 2013 16:14:07 +0200
Konstantinos Asimakis <inshame@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Why would traffic fall after becoming a guard node? Aren't guard nodes
> selected as middle nodes too?

"clients avoid using relays with the Guard flag for hops other than the
first hop, since they assume they've got lots of load from clients who
are using them for the first hop -- but when you first get your Guard
flag, nobody uses you as a guard yet, so you don't have much traffic."
-- arma@xxxxxxx

You don't follow tor-talk@?

> > Personally I don't agree with the theory behind "Guards", and it is highly
> > annoying that there is no way to prevent nodes from becoming Guard.
> >
> What don't you agree with? With the fact that Tor sticks to a set of three
> nodes for the first hop of each circuit

This ^


> or with the way the guard flag is awarded to nodes?

There should exist a torrc option of "I don't want it, dammit."

--
With respect,
Roman

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