Once the decision has been made to publish contactInfo, people with access to the current contactInfo (bridgeDB, isis?) should sent current bridge operators a pre-notice about the upcoming change so they have a chance to react to it. I assume you will not implement this change retroactively (only contactInfo going forward from a given date will be published but not from past descriptors). We could also to reach out to the IMDEA researcher that wrote the bridge paper "Dissecting Tor Bridges: a Security Evaluation of Their Private and Public Infrastructures" as they might have some additional ideas why this could be a bad idea? -- https://mastodon.social/@nusenu twitter: @nusenu_
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