Reminder, as many times before...
Anyone can pay cheap $ to pack yet more nodes
on already saturated providers. This does nothing
for diversity against NSA, GCHQ, BND, RCMP, AFP,
FVEY+, etc... who all share fibre taps, and Sybils, all
who trivially exploit tor. The simple plausibilty of such
is all documented in whitepapers, and in curious cases
of parallel construction.
Your odds at frustrating these adversaries are much better if you:
1) Place nodes where there are no nodes today
by AS and jurisdictional geography.
Don't ask who's popular, permissive, and cheap,
that does nothing, ask who has naught but one other node,
and finally do research on your own to find who has none.
2) Develop a PKI person to person in real life verified
node infrastructure between yourselves that users can
subscribe to.
3) Analyze the fuck out of node metadata and
feed that into subscribable path options.
4) Don't prop up yet another Linux box.
Seems NO ONE is doing this yet, since years
worth of being informed of it. That's a shame.
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