On Mon, January 8, 2018 11:25 am, Dave Warren wrote:
On 2018-01-08 03:21, Florentin Rochet wrote:
Perhaps in the case that the HS operator is not trying to mask the HS
location, the act of mixing public relay traffic can be nothing but a
*help* to defeat anyone trying to correlate traffic coming to the HS
with
traffic emanating from any one client.
Yes, if the HS operator does not want to mask the HS location, then it
is all good. For that purpose, I agree that the warning message should
be changed.
Indeed. I run some public resources (e.g. torproject.org mirror) on a
public URL with a .onion site as well. Nothing is intended to be hidden,
I simply want the content of anything I mirror to be available to Tor
users without relying on an exit.
After an "abuse" report warning me that my hidden site is "leaking" its
location, my root robots.txt and a separate README file now both display
the public and .onion addresses with a note that nothing is intended to
be hidden. (I also appreciate the individual who sent the warning!)
On the flip side, to a new/naive hidden service operator the warning
could be useful as it may not be immediately obvious to someone just
dipping their toes in Tor as to why and how this configuration might
reveal their hidden service's real physical location.
Certainly! I'm not new to Tor/HS and still got tripped up by this,
especially seeing the issue as having been closed, not having realized it
has not in fact been "fixed" and the only thing done was to add a startup
warning. The issue really should be re-opened. It's not unreasonable to
conclude that if the issue linked in the warning is closed that the
warning is obsolete.