[Author Prev][Author Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Author Index][Thread Index]

Re: [tor-relays] Is Kaspersky right to be concerned?

I am pretty sure the answer is "NO", but is there a way to "enhance" Tor in such a way that a relay that does not host hidden services can also choose not to carry traffic for hidden services? That way those who want to use hidden services can do so by using more limited subset of the Tor network at the risk of less anonymity, I suppose. I am not sure how it would work as it seems the client chooses the relays. 


On 03/09/2014 11:17 AM, ra wrote:

On Sunday 09 March 2014 14:02:39 Andrew Lewman wrote:


...


Though you are right to some extent, I think one has to distinguish between
Tor and Tor hidden services. While Tor has it's socially laudable
applications, the vast majority of Tor hidden service usage are in fact not. I
would even go one step further and say: If hidden service usage does not
change drastically, it would be better for Tor's credibility to remove the
hidden service code base. But I am open for discussion on that.

Best,
Robert

_______________________________________________
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays