You could also just want on the spot access to your box without needing some key. I personally believe a proper un/pw combination used in conjunction with fail2ban is sufficiently secure for pretty much anything that is not a high risk target.
IMO there could occasionally be reasons not to use key logins (although I do normally disable pwd login). E.g. if I have a key, I then have evidence somewhere (USB/HD), whereas a secure password can be kept only in my head (until they waterboard me). Especially in countries (e.g. the UK) that can force you to hand over encryption keys. I'd rather have an insecure Tor node than get arrested (although tbh with fail2ban installed I don't think pwd bruteforcing is a threat)._______________________________________________
On 18/11/14 17:46, Jeroen Massar wrote:
On 2014-11-18 18:38, Kevin de Bie wrote:Fail2Ban works really well. Shifting to a non standard port only stops the scriptkids from having too much automated options and does not do anything for actual security. For this reason I personally never bothered with that. Non standard username and password auth with fail2ban makes brute forcing practically impossible, this is usually how I have things configured.Just changing it to key-based authentication stops ALL password-guessing attacks. You will then be left with the logs though. Hence lets make a little list for clarity in order of "should at least do": - Use SSH Authentication - Disable Password Authentication - Use Fail2ban - Restrict on IP address (no need for fail2ban then) Greets, Jeroen _______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxorg
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays