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Re: [tor-relays] serious gap in 'chroot' documentation

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Subject: Re: [tor-relays] serious gap in 'chroot' documentation
From: krishna e bera <keb@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Date: Fri, 18 Oct 2013 08:29:20 -0400
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On 13-10-18 03:34 AM, Fabio Pietrosanti (naif) wrote:
> I think that Tor should implement natively support for self-chrooting
> and that those kind of approach are dirty, unmaintainable, hacks.
> 
> Most security software does support chrooting natively, simply by
> opening the relevant filesystem filedescriptor before chrooting, and
> then operating over it from inside the chroot.

Have you reviewed the patch attached to:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3794
The above may not be about "native" chroot, but this looks like it is at
least partly:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/7005
Perhaps open another enhancement ticket to tie it all together.

Problem: does "chroot" mean anything in a Windows environment?

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Follow-Ups:
- Re: [tor-relays] serious gap in 'chroot' documentation
  - From: Konrad Neitzel

References:
- [tor-relays] serious gap in 'chroot' documentation
  - From: starlight . 2013q4
- Re: [tor-relays] serious gap in 'chroot' documentation
  - From: Fabio Pietrosanti (naif)

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