Am 12.10.26 um 15:45 schrieb boldsuck via tor-relays:
On Monday, 12 October 2026 14:05 dawn.belle.flood via tor-relays wrote:What do people think is the motive behind these attacks? And, who?This will almost certainly be another multi-national law enforcement operation, similar to Operation Lobos, Habitance, or most recently, Liberty Lane. https://lists.torproject.org/mailman3/hyperkitty/list/tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx/thread/DQCYCWV27XXI7MGDWYGPWPTTQKCFRFRT/#53MVXVJ3YHU6JO63LIISCHABE6KAZDNS These operations against long running HiddenServices often take years and are costly. The most important thing is that ordinary Tor users are not deanonymized.
Does it help that less relays have the HSDir flag for the attacker? What about the many relays with low bandwidth running at home-user sites? Are they also being attacked that much?
The relay is forced to restart e.g. by the out-of-memory (OOM) killer and loses its HSDir status. https://www.petsymposium.org/foci/2024/foci-2024-0014.pdf https://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings-article/sp/2026/606500b316/2bojw45PzIk There’s nothing the Tor devs can do about that, either. Keep your relays running as stably as possible. Don't get upset about status flags. Enjoy life & German (CanG) ;-)
Don't smoke too much. :-)
My solution: - I was at the C-IX with niftybunny and fully populated all 24 RAM slots on both servers. - I’ve been testing BBR congestion control and fq for a few days now. This has significantly reduced the CPU load. :-)
I operate a relay that got and lost the guard flag many times, but keeps the HSDir flag. I currently do not see attacks that make the relay unusable or something else.
-- Gruß Marco Muell und Spam bitte an abfalleimer2002@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Attachment:
OpenPGP_signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx