Am 13.10.26 um 08:17 schrieb Marco Moock via tor-relays:
Am 13.10.26 um 00:53 schrieb forest via tor-relays:That was only possible in the v2 days, but v3 onion services are blinded which means it's not possible to find out the .onion address even if you are their HSDir. There's very little an attacker can do in the position of HSDir besides selective censorship (if they already know the .onion, they can match it to the descriptor and censor it). CCing Tobias Höller who I know is working on HSDir research and might have some insight into this whole situation.Are relays known which have HSDir and do such censorship attacks? Is there a good way to detect such attacks?
Now I got:[warn] Your computer is too slow to handle this many circuit creation requests! Please consider using the MaxAdvertisedBandwidth config option or choosing a more restricted exit policy
Is that maybe part of an attack?The machine is an Intel Atom, but normally it was able to handle all the traffic. I also saw that Tor creates load on one core, not on 2.
Is Tor able to spawn 2 processes to handle the traffic? -- Gruß Marco Muell und Spam bitte an abfalleimer2002@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Attachment:
OpenPGP_signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
_______________________________________________ tor-relays mailing list -- tor-relays@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx To unsubscribe send an email to tor-relays-leave@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx