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Re: [tor-relays] Deciding where to put new Tor relays

> They're also likely to be wiretapping magnets.

That's an interesting point. Can we go deeper into this?

Does this mean that, everything else being equal, the good locations for Tor nodes also happen to be the good locations for surveillance tapping points?


If yes, my first thought was that maybe we'd want to adjust our formula so that Tor relays don't coincide too much with these wiretap points. However, given that the ASs of Tor relays are public I'm not sure it matters---if intelligence prioritizes spying on Tor relays they will simply download the list and tap the desired relays, regardless of where the relay is topographically located.

Taken together, I'm inclined to say this remains the right way to prioritize ASs for new Tor nodes.

-V

On Thu, 10 Sep 2015 at 12:53 grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 1:12 AM, Virgil Griffith <i@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> URL: http://labs.apnic.net/vizas/
>
> For Tor, this tool helps us prioritize the ASs for new relays. To maximize
> censorship resistance, we would want relays on AS numbers in the middle
> (lots of interconnections) that do not currently have Tor relays.

Yes, assuming they're well connected to censoring AS's and censored users.
They're also likely to be wiretapping magnets.
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