Re: [tor-relays] Deciding where to put new Tor relays

[grarpamp <grarpamp@xxxxxxxxx>]

On Thu, Sep 10, 2015 at 3:54 AM, Virgil Griffith <i@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> good locations...

> intelligence prioritizes spying on Tor relays they will simply download the
> list and tap the desired relays, regardless of where the relay is
> topographically located.

There may be situations in which tapping at a particular vantage
point will capture most traffic of many relays, such that resources
tapping each one of them is unnecessary, even if there is some
loss in visibility due to the tap necessarily being some distance
from all of the relays thus missing some traffic traversing them
on the side.

>> > maximize
>> > censorship resistance, we would want relays on AS numbers in the middle
>> > (lots of interconnections) that do not currently have Tor relays.
>>
>> Yes, assuming they're well connected to censoring AS's and censored users.

I think I'm retracting this as gibberish train of thought.
At the IP / dpi level, censored is censored, not much getting
around it, you either get out to your remote guard, or your local
guard gets out to the next hop, or you don't.

Though the well connectedness could help performance
such as latency by possibly having fewer hops and policies
appear between any two relays.

And diversity seeking that do not go too far out to the
edges so as to affect performance. I've yet to lookup
the central AS's but I'm guessing they'll all be major
transit. And the edge ones will be small ISP's / regionals.

There may be point in locating at the edges that
prefer peer with each other, so as to avoid potentially
easier aggregate tapping at the core. Though finding
those relationships in order to weave those paths is hard.

Reference some other posts I made about traffic arcs
across the globe and minimum RTT.
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