Flags are a *recommendation* to clients. They don't force clients to behave a certain way. For example: * clients connecting via bridges can use a middle node as their second hop. These middle nodes will leak bridge addresses via nyx. * clients and relays can have different consensuses: * if a relay loses the Guard flag, and finds out earlier than its clients, nyx will stop protecting those clients * if a client finds out before the relay, nyx won't protect those clients * some Tor client versions don't check the guard flag at all. Others keep their guards, even if they lose the flag * middle and exit relays can be used as bridges, even if they don't set BridgeRelay * older Tor versions have a non-zero probability of choosing any relay as an entry, even if it doesn't have the guard flag * various config options make tor clients ignore the Guard flag Please only show an IP if the relay is already public in the consensus.
[1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/nyx.git/tree/nyx/panel/connection.py#n230 But the IP check works in most cases, and if it fails, it's ok to keep more info private. T |
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